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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Over 130 million workers are protected from substandard wages and working conditions by the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). This act contains specific provisions to ensure that workers are paid the 
federal minimum wage and for overtime, and that youth are protected from working too many hours and 
from hazardous conditions. The Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division (WHD) is responsible for 
enforcing employer compliance with FLSA. 
To secure compliance, WHD uses enforcement actions, partnerships with external groups, and outreach 
activities. 
In response to a congressional request, we examined (1) the trends in FLSA compliance activities from 
fiscal years 1997 to 2007, (2) the effectiveness of WHD's efforts to plan and conduct these activities, and 
(3) the extent to which these activities have improved FLSA compliance. 
From fiscal years 1997 to 2007, the number of WHD's enforcement actions decreased by more than a 
third, from approximately 47,000 in 1997 to just under 30,000 in 2007. According to WHD, the total 
number of actions decreased over this period because of three factors: the increased use of more time-
consuming comprehensive investigations, a decrease in the number of investigators, and screening of 
complaints to eliminate those that may not result in violations. Most of these actions (72 percent) were 
initiated from 1997 to 2007 in response to complaints from workers. The remaining enforcement actions, 
which were initiated by WHD, were concentrated in four industry groups: agriculture, accommodation and 
food services, manufacturing, and health care and social services. WHD's other two types of compliance 
activities -- partnerships and outreach -- constituted about 19 percent of WHD's staff time based on 
available data from 2000 to 2007. 
WHD did not effectively take advantage of available information and tools in planning and conducting its 
compliance activities. In planning these activities, WHD did not use available information, including key 
data on complaints and input from external groups such as employer and worker advocacy organizations, 
to inform its planning process. Also, in targeting businesses for investigation, WHD focused on the same 
industries from 1997 to 2007 despite information from its commissioned studies on low wage industries 
in which FLSA violations are likely to occur. As a result, WHD may not be addressing the needs of workers 
most vulnerable to FLSA violations. Finally, the agency does not sufficiently leverage its existing tools, 
such as tracking the use and collection of penalties and back wages, or using its hotlines and 
partnerships, to encourage employers to comply with FLSA and reach potential complainants. 
The extent to which WHD's activities have improved FLSA compliance is unknown because WHD 
frequently changes both how it measures and how it reports on its performance. When agencies provide 
trend data in their performance reports, decision makers can compare current and past progress in 
meeting long-term goals. While WHD's long-term goals and strategies generally remained the same from 
1997 to 2007, WHD often changed how it measured its progress, keeping about 90 percent of its 
measures for 2 years or less. Moreover, WHD established a total of 131 performance measures 
throughout this period, but reported on 6 of these measures for more than 1 year. This lack of consistent 
information on WHD's progress in meeting its goals makes it difficult to assess how well WHD's efforts 
are improving compliance with FLSA. 
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Over 130 million workers are 
protected from substandard wages 
and working conditions by the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA). This 
act contains specific provisions to 
ensure that workers are paid the 
federal minimum wage and for 
overtime, and that youth are 
protected from working too many 
hours and from hazardous 
conditions. The Department of 
Labor’s Wage and Hour Division 
(WHD) is responsible for enforcing 
employer compliance with FLSA. 
 
To secure compliance, WHD uses 
enforcement actions, partnerships 
with external groups, and outreach 
activities. 
 
In response to a congressional 
request, we examined (1) the 
trends in FLSA compliance 
activities from fiscal years 1997 to 
2007, (2) the effectiveness of 
WHD’s efforts to plan and conduct 
these activities, and (3) the extent 
to which these activities have 
improved FLSA compliance. 
From fiscal years 1997 to 2007, the number of WHD’s enforcement actions 
decreased by more than a third, from approximately 47,000 in 1997 to just under 
30,000 in 2007. According to WHD, the total number of actions decreased over 
this period because of three factors: the increased use of more time-
consuming comprehensive investigations, a decrease in the number of 
investigators, and screening of complaints to eliminate those that may not 
result in violations. Most of these actions (72 percent) were initiated from 1997 to 
2007 in response to complaints from workers. The remaining enforcement actions, 
which were initiated by WHD, were concentrated in four industry groups: 
agriculture, accommodation and food services, manufacturing, and health care and 
social services. WHD’s other two types of compliance activities—partnerships and 
outreach—constituted about 19 percent of WHD’s staff time based on available 
data from 2000 to 2007. 
 
WHD did not effectively take advantage of available information and tools in 
planning and conducting its compliance activities. In planning these activities, 
WHD did not use available information, including key data on complaints and 
input from external groups such as employer and worker advocacy 
organizations, to inform its planning process. Also, in targeting businesses for 
investigation, WHD focused on the same industries from 1997 to 2007 despite 
information from its commissioned studies on low wage industries in which 
FLSA violations are likely to occur. As a result, WHD may not be addressing 
the needs of workers most vulnerable to FLSA violations. Finally, the agency 
does not sufficiently leverage its existing tools, such as tracking the use and 
collection of penalties and back wages, or using its hotlines and partnerships, 
to encourage employers to comply with FLSA and reach potential 
complainants. 
 
The extent to which WHD’s activities have improved FLSA compliance is 
unknown because WHD frequently changes both how it measures and how it 
reports on its performance. When agencies provide trend data in their 
performance reports, decision makers can compare current and past progress 
in meeting long-term goals. While WHD’s long-term goals and strategies 
generally remained the same from 1997 to 2007, WHD often changed how it 
measured its progress, keeping about 90 percent of its measures for 2 years or 
less. Moreover, WHD established a total of 131 performance measures throughout 
this period, but reported on 6 of these measures for more than 1 year. This lack of 
consistent information on WHD’s progress in meeting its goals makes it difficult 
to assess how well WHD’s efforts are improving compliance with FLSA. 
 
 
 
What GAO Recommends  
To better plan and conduct FLSA 
compliance activities, GAO 
recommends that WHD evaluate 
complaint data, obtain and use 
input from external stakeholders, 
incorporate data from its studies, 
and leverage existing tools. GAO 
also recommends that WHD 
establish, consistently maintain, 
and report on its performance. 
 
GAO provided a draft of this 
statement to WHD but it declined 
to officially comment prior to the 
hearing. 
To view the full product, including the scope 
and methodology, click on GAO-08-962T. 
For more information, contact Anne-Marie 
Lasowski at (202) 512-7215 or 
lasowskia@gao.gov. 
 
 
 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Labor’s 
(Labor) Wage and Hour Division’s (WHD) efforts to enforce compliance 
with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), as amended, which protects 
over 130 million eligible workers from substandard wages and working 
conditions.1 The act contains specific provisions designed to ensure that 
workers are paid at least the federal minimum wage and for overtime, and 
that youth are protected from working too many hours and from 
hazardous conditions. 
In response to your request, we examined WHD’s efforts from fiscal years 
1997 to 2007 to ensure compliance with FLSA’s provisions for minimum 
wage, overtime, and child labor. Accordingly, this statement provides 
information on (1) the trends in WHD’s compliance activities from fiscal 
years 1997 to 2007; (2) the effectiveness of WHD’s efforts to plan and 
conduct these activities; and (3) the extent to which WHD’s activities have 
improved FLSA compliance over this period. 
To address these objectives, we obtained and analyzed data from WHD’s 
Wage and Hour Investigator Support and Reporting Database (WHISARD) 
on enforcement actions, back wages, penalties, partnerships, and outreach 
activities from fiscal years 1997 to 2007, as available.2 All data we reported 
were assessed for reliability and determined to be sufficiently reliable for 
the purposes of this statement. We also analyzed annual performance 
plans and reports in light of GAO’s work and guidance on strategic 
planning and performance management for regulatory agencies, and 
examined performance assessments conducted by outside experts at 
WHD’s request. In addition, we reviewed relevant federal laws and 
regulations. Finally, we interviewed WHD officials at the national and 
regional level, and external organizations representing employers and 
employees affected by WHD’s compliance activities and visited WHD and 
state offices in California, Georgia, New Hampshire, Texas, and Wisconsin. 
We conducted this performance audit from August 2007 through July 2008 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
                                                                                                                                    
1Pub. L. No. 75-718 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.). 
2For the remainder of this statement, when we refer to years, we are referring to the federal 
fiscal year (October 1 to September 30.) 
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findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. For more information on our 
scope and methodology, see attachment I. 
 
From 1997 to 2007, the number of WHD’s enforcement actions decreased 
by more than a third, from approximately 47,000 in 1997 to just under 
30,000 in 2007. WHD’s two other compliance activities—partnerships and 
outreach activities—constituted about 19 percent of the agency’s staff 
time, based on available data from 2000 to 2007. In planning and 
conducting its compliance activities, WHD did not effectively take 
advantage of available information and tools. Specifically, WHD did not 
use information, including data on complaints and input from external 
groups, such as employer and worker advocacy organizations, to inform 
its planning efforts. Also, in targeting employers for investigation, WHD 
focused on the same industries from 1997 to 2007 despite information 
from its commissioned studies on low wage industries in which FLSA 
violations are likely to occur. As a result, WHD may not be addressing the 
needs of workers most vulnerable to FLSA violations. In addition, the 
agency does not sufficiently leverage existing tools, such as its 
partnerships, to encourage employers to comply with FLSA and reach 
potential complainants. The extent to which WHD’s activities have 
improved FLSA compliance is unknown, because the agency frequently 
changes both how it measures and how it reports on its performance. 
While WHD’s long-term goals and strategies have generally remained the 
same since 1997, WHD often changed how it measured its progress, 
keeping about 90 percent of its measures for 2 years or less. Moreover, 
although WHD established a total of 131 performance measures 
throughout the period from 1997 to 2007, it reported on 6 of these 
measures for more than 1 year. This lack of consistent information on 
WHD’s progress in meeting its goals makes it difficult to assess how well 
its efforts are improving compliance with FLSA. 
Summary 
To better plan and conduct its FLSA compliance activities, we are 
recommending that WHD evaluate complaint data, obtain and use input 
from external stakeholders, incorporate data from its commissioned 
studies, and leverage existing tools. We are also recommending that WHD 
establish, consistently maintain, and report on its performance measures. 
We met with WHD officials to discuss our findings and recommendations 
and incorporated their comments as appropriate. We also provided a copy 
of our draft statement to WHD, but the agency declined to comment prior 
to the hearing. 
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Since FLSA was enacted, Congress has amended it several times, including 
recently increasing the federal minimum wage from $5.15 an hour, which it 
has been since September 1997, to $7.25 an hour in three steps over a 2-
year period ending in July 2009. In 2007, about 2 million workers were 
earning at or below the federal minimum wage.3 FLSA also limits the 
normal work week to 40 hours and requires that most employers pay 1½ 
times normal wages, or overtime pay, to eligible employees who work 
longer hours.4 Furthermore, FLSA and its regulations limit the types of 
jobs, number of hours, times of day, and types of equipment that youth can 
work.5
Background 
WHD’s headquarters office, 5 regional offices, and 74 district and field 
offices with approximately 730 investigative staff are responsible for 
enforcing employer compliance with labor laws. In 2007, WHD’s budget 
was approximately $165 million. 
WHD conducts several types of enforcement actions, ranging from 
comprehensive investigations covering all laws under the agency’s 
jurisdiction to conciliations, a quick remediation process generally limited 
to a single alleged FLSA violation—such as a missed paycheck for a single 
worker, in which a WHD investigator contacts the employer by phone to 
try to resolve a complaint received from a worker. 6
WHD also initiates enforcement actions in an effort to target employers 
likely to violate FLSA. For many years, WHD officials have considered low 
wage workers to be most vulnerable to FLSA violations. In 2007, about 54 
million workers were among this population.7 Furthermore, WHD officials, 
researchers, and employee advocates have expressed concerns that 
                                                                                                                                    
3The 95 percent confidence interval is within +/- 5.05 percent of this estimate. 
4Certain kinds of employees are not covered by various aspects of the FLSA.  For example, 
certain executive, administrative, or professional employees and outside sales employees 
are among those that are exempt from FLSA’s minimum wage and maximum hour 
requirements. Section 13 of the FLSA provides more detailed information about exempt 
employees. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a). 
5FLSA provides the Secretary of Labor with the authority to determine which jobs and 
equipment are too hazardous for children under the age of 18 or detrimental to their health 
or well-being.  
6We have defined the activities WHD conducts as part of its enforcement strategy as 
“enforcement actions” to distinguish them from its partnership and outreach activities. 
7This 95 percent confidence interval is within +/- 1.96 percent of this estimate. 
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foreign born workers, although generally protected by FLSA to the same 
extent as other workers, may be less likely than others to complain 
because they may be unaware of federal laws or fear deportation if they 
are undocumented. About 19 percent of low wage workers, as defined by 
researchers in studies commissioned by WHD, were foreign born in 2007.8
When WHD finds violations during enforcement actions, it computes and 
attempts to collect back wages owed to workers and, where permitted by 
law, imposes penalties and other remedies.9 Other remedies pertaining to 
FLSA include the hot goods provision, which allows WHD to seize goods 
created in violation of FLSA, and liquidated damages, which permit 
workers to receive additional damages as a result of minimum wage or 
overtime violations. If employers refuse to pay the back wages and/or 
penalties assessed, WHD officials, with the assistance of attorneys from 
Labor’s Office of the Solicitor, may pursue the cases in the courts. 
WHD’s partnerships are formal written agreements with external groups—
including states, foreign consulates, and employee and employer 
associations—designed to improve compliance.10 Its outreach activities 
include informational materials and seminars for employers and workers 
designed to improve public awareness of the provisions of FLSA. WHD 
holds seminars, provides training to employer associations, and distributes 
materials on FLSA provisions to employers and workers. In addition, as 
part of its outreach activities, WHD provides technical assistance to 
employers through its local offices, national hotline, and Web site. 
WHD, like other federal agencies, is required by the Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) to establish a framework to 
help align its activities with the agency’s mission and goals. It is also 
required to develop long-term goals as well as establish performance 
measures to use in assessing the success of its efforts. Furthermore, to 
                                                                                                                                    
8This 95 percent confidence interval is within +/- 1.96 percent of this estimate. 
9Penalties are fines that WHD may impose when employers violate child labor provisions or 
are found to have willfully or repeatedly violated the minimum wage or overtime provisions 
of FLSA. They are known as “civil money penalties.” 
10Many states have labor laws that offer similar protections to those in FLSA, but state laws 
vary in the issues they address and the extent to which they are enforced. In general, if 
both federal and state law apply, the more stringent (i.e. the one more protective for the 
worker) takes precedence. 
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promote agency accountability, it is required to issue annual performance 
reports on its progress in meeting these goals. 
From 1997 to 2007, the number of WHD’s enforcement actions decreased 
by more than a third, from approximately 47,000 actions in 1997 to just 
under 30,000 in 2007. According to WHD, although enforcement actions 
have comprised the majority of its compliance activities, the total number 
of actions decreased over this period because of three factors: the 
increased use of more time-consuming comprehensive investigations, a 
decrease in the number of investigators, and improved screening of 
complaints to eliminate those that may not result in violations. Most of 
these enforcement actions conducted from 1997 to 20007 were initiated by 
complaints from workers. The remaining enforcement actions, which were 
initiated by WHD, decreased 45 percent over the period, from 
approximately 13,000 in 1997 to approximately 7,000 in 2007. WHD’s 
partnerships and outreach activities constituted about 19 percent of its 
total staff time.  
 
The Number of 
Enforcement Actions 
Has Decreased, 
although Enforcement 
Remained WHD’s 
Major Compliance 
Activity 
Total Number of 
Enforcement Actions Has 
Decreased 
From 1997 to 2007, the total number of FLSA enforcement actions WHD 
conducted decreased, and lengthy, comprehensive investigations made up 
an increasingly larger share of this total. Of WHD’s total resources, the 
majority was spent ensuring compliance with FLSA, which covers more 
workers than the other laws under WHD’s jurisdiction.11 Based on 
available data from 2000 to 2007, the majority of staff time spent on FLSA 
compliance activities—81 percent—was spent on enforcement. However, 
the total number of enforcement actions, including investigations and 
conciliations, declined from approximately 47,000 in 1997 to just under 
30,000 in 2007, as shown in figure 1. 
                                                                                                                                    
11In addition to the FLSA, WHD also enforces the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker 
Protection Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Davis Bacon Act, and other federal 
labor laws. 
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Figure 1: Total Number of FLSA Enforcement Actions, 1997 to 2007 
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In addition, WHD attributed the decrease in the number of enforcement 
actions to three factors. First, the proportion of comprehensive 
investigations, which require more staff time than other types of 
enforcement actions, increased over this period—from 39 percent of all 
enforcement actions in 2000 to 51 percent in 2007. 12 Agency officials said 
that WHD emphasized comprehensive investigations in an effort to 
increase future compliance because they provide an opportunity for WHD 
to educate employers about the laws under its jurisdiction. Second, 
officials cited the decrease in the agency’s investigative staff—and the loss 
of experienced investigators in particular—as reasons for this trend. As 
shown in figure 2, the number of investigators decreased over this period 
by more than 20 percent, from 942 in 1997 to 732 in 2007. Finally, a senior 
WHD official told us that the agency now screens out complaints that are 
not likely to result in FLSA violations more effectively than it did 
previously. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
12Although reliable data on the number of enforcement actions WHD conducted from 1997 
to 2007 were available, data on the types of enforcement actions WHD conducted prior to 
2000 were not reliable and therefore are not included in this statement. 
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Figure 2: Number of WHD Investigators, 1997 to 2007 
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The majority (72 percent) of WHD’s enforcement actions were initiated in 
response to complaints from workers. From 2000 to 2007, more than half 
of these enforcement actions—approximately 52 percent—were 
conciliations, which WHD conducted over the phone.13 Conciliations were 
also the quickest type of enforcement action—taking 2½ hours, on 
average, compared to nearly 35 hours, on average, for other types of 
enforcement actions. However, conciliations are generally limited to a 
complaint about a single violation involving only one worker. Although 
this enforcement action allows initial complaints to be quickly closed, a 
WHD-commissioned study found conciliations to be associated with an 
increased probability of detecting violations in subsequent investigations 
of a specific employer. Further information on complaints handled via 
conciliations can be found in a companion GAO testimony being released 
WHD Responds to Most 
Complaints with Conciliations 
                                                                                                                                    
13Although data on the source of WHD’s enforcement actions (i.e., whether the actions 
were initiated by complaints from workers or by WHD) were available for the entire period 
from 1997 to 2007, as noted previously, reliable data on the types of enforcement actions 
conducted by WHD was not available prior to 2000. 
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today for this hearing.14 Nearly all of the remaining enforcement actions 
initiated by complaints from workers were comprehensive investigations 
(38 percent) or limited investigations (7 percent). See figure 3 for the types 
of enforcement actions WHD conducted in response to complaints from 
2000 through 2007. 
Figure 3: Enforcement Actions Used to Respond to Complaints, 2000 to 2007 
7%
38%52%
Source: GAO analysis of WHD data.
3%
Otherb
Limited investigationsa
Comprehensive investigations
Conciliations
aLimited investigations have a narrower scope than comprehensive investigations. For example, a 
limited investigation could focus on a particular employee or employees, a department at the 
employer’s worksite, an employment practice, a particular time frame, one law under WHD’s 
jurisdiction, or one section of FLSA. 
bOther enforcement actions include self-audits, in which employers conduct fact finding and resolve 
problems under WHD’s supervision, and office audits, in which employers visit WHD and provide the 
records requested. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
14GAO. Department of Labor: Cases Studies from Ongoing Work Show Examples in 
Which Wage and Hour Division Did Not Adequately Pursue Labor Violations, 
GAO-08-973T. (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2008). 
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From 1997 to 2007, the number of WHD-initiated enforcement actions 
declined by 45 percent, as shown in figure 4. As a proportion of all 
enforcement actions, those initiated by WHD decreased slightly over the 
period, from 28 percent of all actions in 1997 to 24 percent in 2007. 
WHD-Initiated Actions Have 
Decreased and Have Targeted 
the Same Industries 
Figure 4: WHD-initiated Enforcement Actions, 1997 to 2007 
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From 2000 to 2007, in planning and conducting WHD-initiated enforcement 
actions, the agency primarily targeted four industry groups: agriculture, 
accommodation and food services, manufacturing, and health care and 
social services. 15 These four industries generally coincide with those for 
which WHD had strategic initiatives for increasing compliance for several 
years: agriculture, restaurants, garment manufacturing, and health care. 
The agency conducted the largest proportion of WHD-initiated 
enforcement actions—22 percent—in the accommodation and food 
services industry. However, at the same time, WHD increased its focus on 
the agriculture industry from 7 percent of WHD-initiated enforcement 
actions in 2000 to 20 percent in 2007. The majority of enforcement actions 
in the agriculture industry—82 percent—were initiated by WHD, while 
                                                                                                                                    
15Reliable data regarding industrial classification were not reliable prior to 2000 and are not 
included in our statement. 
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actions in all other industries were usually initiated as a result of 
complaints. 
The number of enforcement actions and the proportion of WHD-initiated 
enforcement actions varied among WHD’s five regions. For example, 
WHD’s Southeastern region conducted the largest number of enforcement 
actions—approximately 128,000 from 1997 to 2007. In contrast, the 
Western region conducted the fewest—approximately 44,000. In addition, 
because the Western region had a smaller workload of enforcement 
actions initiated by complaints, nearly half of its enforcement actions 
conducted from 1997 to 2007 were initiated by WHD, compared to only 14 
percent for the Southeastern region. Agency officials said that when states 
have no minimum wage or overtime standards, or weak enforcement of 
such laws, WHD regions in which those states are located have heavier 
complaint workloads. Across WHD’s five regions, regions with a greater 
proportion of states with a minimum wage below the federal level16 also 
had a greater proportion of enforcement actions that were initiated by 
complaints.  
 
Total Amount of Back 
Wages Assessed by WHD 
Have Increased, but the 
Use of Penalties is Limited 
In the majority of its enforcement actions—approximately 75 percent from 
2000 to 2007—WHD found employers in violation of FLSA, and most of 
these violations were of the overtime provisions of FLSA. In 2007, for 
example, nearly 85 percent of the FLSA violations WHD found were 
related to overtime, while 14 percent were minimum wage violations, and 
2 percent were violations of FLSA’s child labor provisions.17 When 
violations were found, employers agreed to pay some amount of the back 
wages owed to their workers approximately 90 percent of the time.18 In 
addition, the total amount of back wages employers agreed to pay 
increased by 41 percent, from approximately $164 million in 2000 to about 
$230 million in 2007—the highest amount for this period.19 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                                    
16This includes states with no state minimum wage. 
17Due to rounding, these percentages do not add up to 100. In addition, less than 3 percent 
of FLSA violations found were violations of, for example, recordkeeping regulations or 
regulations requiring the display of informational posters. These violations are not 
attributable to the overtime, minimum wage, or child labor provisions of FLSA, and are not 
associated with the payment of back wages or penalties, and are therefore not included in 
our calculations. 
18We did not include data on back wages assessed by WHD prior to 2000 because they were 
not reliable. 
19The amounts shown are in current dollars. 
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the average amount of back wages per enforcement action nearly doubled, 
increasing from approximately $5,400 per enforcement action in 2000 to 
$10,500 in 2007. In those cases in which employers agreed to pay, most 
(about 94 percent) resulted in employers agreeing to pay the full amount 
they owed to workers. However, in 6 percent of the cases, employers 
agreed to pay less than the amount they owed—an average of 24 cents for 
each dollar owed. In addition, WHD could not provide us with data on the 
amount of back wages assessed that were collected because WHD does 
not track this information in their WHISARD database. 
In addition to assessing back wages from employers found to be in 
violation of FLSA, WHD may also assess penalties for repeated or willful 
violations, or for child labor violations, but the agency made limited use of 
these penalties from 2000 to 2007.20 WHD assessed penalties for 6 percent 
of the enforcement actions conducted during this period in which it found 
FLSA violations.21 This percentage increased to a peak of almost 9 percent 
in 2001, before falling steadily to under 5 percent in 2006. 
 
Partnerships and Outreach 
Activities Represent a 
Small Proportion of WHD’s 
Workload 
Partnerships and outreach represent a small proportion of WHD’s 
compliance activities, constituting about 19 percent of all WHD staff time 
from 2000 to 2007.22 From 1999 to 2007, the agency established 78 formal 
partnerships, 67 of which were still in place as of March 2008.23 Its earlier 
partnerships were largely with state governments, while more recent 
partnerships were primarily with employer groups. Other partnerships 
                                                                                                                                    
20A repeat violation is a violation in which the employer previously violated the minimum 
wage or overtime requirements of FLSA, provided the employer was previously notified by 
WHD that it had allegedly violated the law, or if a court or other tribunal found a previous 
violation, unless that finding was appealed or set aside. A willful violation is one in which 
the employer knew its conduct was prohibited by FLSA or showed reckless disregard for 
the requirements of FLSA. In determining whether a violation is willful, WHD takes into 
account all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the violation. 
21FLSA limits the assessment of penalties to investigations in which willful, repeat, or child 
labor violations are found. 
22 According to WHD officials and agency data, the large majority of partnership 
agreements entailed outreach activities. Joint enforcement actions were mentioned in a 
small proportion of partnership agreement documents, though WHD officials and a WHD 
partner reported that the agency was not fully participating in these joint enforcement 
efforts. Therefore, time spent on partnerships was almost completely accounted for in 
outreach event time, and our analysis groups the two strategies together 
23Partnership agreement documents were not available for partnerships formed prior to 
1999. 
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included worker associations, foreign consulates, and other agencies 
within the federal government. Overall, there was limited growth in the 
number of partnerships that WHD established, with a peak of 15 in 2004.  
According to its partnership agreements, WHD sought to utilize 
partnerships in several ways to improve FLSA compliance. The most 
common partnership activity was education, which was specified in 94 
percent of partnership agreements. Education encompasses a number of 
activities, including WHD attendance at seminars and training sessions 
regarding wage and hour laws and the distribution of pamphlets and other 
educational materials to workers and employers. The second most 
common partnership activity was complaint referrals. More than half of 
the partnership agreement documents contained language that encouraged 
or provided guidelines for partners to refer relevant complaints to WHD 
and, in the case of other governmental partners such as state labor 
agencies, for WHD to refer cases to them. 
Other partnership activities included 
• monitoring agreements, which provided guidelines for employers to 
use in monitoring themselves or their contractors for potential FLSA 
violations and reporting violations to WHD; 
 
• sharing of enforcement information, mainly used in partnerships with 
other federal or state enforcement agencies; and 
 
• bilingual assistance, which included the distribution of educational 
materials in foreign languages and assistance with translation of wage 
and hour regulations. 
 
From 2000 to 2007, WHD conducted approximately 13,600 FLSA-related 
outreach activities such as seminars, exhibits, media appearances, and 
mailings.24 During this period, the percentage of staff time spent on 
outreach events decreased, from approximately 22 percent in 2000 to 13 
percent in 2007. From 2003 to 2007, the largest proportion of outreach 
events targeted employers, although more diverse audiences have been 
included in recent years. Over this period, employers were the intended 
                                                                                                                                    
24Although the recording of data regarding outreach activities was not mandatory prior to 
2003, WHD officials said that the entry of time spent on outreach as well as a record of the 
event was required in order for staff to be paid, so we have included those data for 2000 
through 2007. All other outreach data reported include only events from 2003 to 2007. 
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audience for 46 percent of the outreach events WHD conducted. In 
contrast, workers were the intended audience for 14 percent of events. 
However, over this period, WHD began to target more diverse groups of 
non employer groups, including schools, governmental agencies, and 
community-based organizations. 
 
In planning and conducting its compliance activities, WHD does not 
effectively use available information and tools. First, WHD does not use 
information, such as data on the number of complaints each office 
receives or the backlog of complaints for each office, or other information, 
such as input from external groups. This information could help the 
agency manage its workload and allocate its staff resources accordingly. 
Second, in targeting employers for investigation, WHD focused on 
employers in the same industries from 1997 to 2007, despite findings from 
its commissioned studies intended to help it focus on low wage industries 
in which FLSA violations are likely to occur. Finally, the agency may not 
sufficiently leverage existing tools such as hotlines and partnerships to 
improve compliance with FLSA. 
 
WHD Does Not 
Effectively Use 
Available Information 
and Tools in Planning 
and Conducting Its 
Compliance Activities 
WHD Does Not Use 
Available Information to 
Inform Its Planning Efforts 
In planning its FLSA compliance activities, WHD does not use the 
following information to focus its work: 
Information on complaints received from workers. WHD does not 
use key information regarding the complaints it receives from workers 
that could help the agency manage its workload. First, WHD does not have 
a consistent process for documenting the receipt of, or actions taken in 
response to, complaints. According to guidance on GPRA planning, 
understanding customers’ needs, such the demand for WHD’s services in 
response to complaints, is important to help ensure that an agency aligns 
its activities, processes, and resources to support its mission and help it 
achieve its goals.25 Although WHD’s Field Operations Handbook provides 
guidelines for recording complaints, and there is a complaint intake screen 
in the agency’s WHISARD database, the handbook also states that, even if 
a complaint indicates probable violations, it may be rejected by district 
office managers based on factors such as the office’s workload or 
available travel funds. Therefore, WHD staff usually enter a complaint into 
                                                                                                                                    
25GAO. Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and 
Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996). 
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the database only when it is likely to result in finding of violations. In 
addition, although one office we visited maintained separate logs of all 
complaints received, WHD does not require all complaints, including the 
actions taken, to be recorded. As a result, WHD does not have a complete 
picture of all of the complaints it receives and the agency cannot be held 
accountable for the actions it takes in response to complaints. 
Backlogs of complaints. Although the number of complaints each office 
receives greatly affects its workload and ability to initiate investigations, 
WHD does not have a consistent process for tracking information on 
complaint backlogs across its offices. For data to be useful to GPRA 
planning and an agency’s decision making, they must be complete, 
accurate, and consistent. WHD officials told us that the agency’s offices 
vary in how they track their backlogs of complaints. However, 
headquarters officials said that they do not track the regional or district 
offices’ backlogs, nor do they know how they are measured. Therefore, 
WHD cannot consider these backlogs in its planning efforts, including its 
allocation of staff resources to its regional and district offices. 
Input from external groups such as employer and worker 
advocacy organizations with an interest in WHD’s activities. In 
the past, WHD held meetings with external stakeholders—organizations 
with an interest in the agency’s activities—at a national level, but more 
recently, the agency has relied on second-hand information from its 
district offices to identify the concerns of these groups. GAO has reported 
that it is important to involve external stakeholders in the planning 
process, such as developing goals and performance measures.26 Agencies 
that have involved these external groups report that this cooperation has 
allowed them to more effectively use their resources. According to agency 
headquarters officials, prior to 2000, WHD held meetings at a national level 
with external organizations such as industry groups, advocates, unions, 
and state officials. Around 2000, WHD began relying instead on its district 
office staff to gather input on external stakeholders’ concerns and provide 
this information at WHD’s annual planning meetings. However, these 
planning meetings are not held until after the agency’s national and 
regional priorities are set, thereby limiting external stakeholder input in 
the early phases of the process. In addition, WHD headquarters officials 
said its district offices report input from external stakeholders as part of 
                                                                                                                                    
26GAO, Managing for Results: Strengthening Regulatory Agencies’ Performance 
Management Practices, GAO/GGD-00-10 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 28, 1999). 
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annual performance reports submitted to the regional offices. However, 
we found little evidence of stakeholder recommendations in WHD’s 
planning and reporting documents. 
State labor regulations and levels of enforcement. In planning the 
allocation of staff to its regional offices, WHD does not consider 
information on state labor laws or the extent to which these laws are 
enforced for the states covered by the district offices in each region. 
According to GPRA guidance, understanding the external environment in 
which its offices operate should be a key part of WHD’s strategic planning 
process.27 Because WHD offices in states with weaker labor laws or 
enforcement may receive more complaints, these factors may directly 
affect the workload of WHD’s district offices. For example, according to 
WHD officials, because the state of Georgia does not conduct 
investigations of overtime or minimum wage violations, the Atlanta WHD 
district office has a heavy workload of complaints regarding these issues.  
Officials told us that WHD headquarters does not consider state laws or 
enforcement in making allocations of investigators to its regions, and that 
each region has been allocated approximately five investigators each year 
for the past few years. 
 
WHD Did Not Change How 
It Targets Its WHD-
Initiated Investigations, 
despite Information from 
Its Studies of Low Wage 
Industries 
From 1997 to 2007, in targeting employers for investigation, WHD focused 
on employers in the same industries despite obtaining information from its 
commissioned studies on low wage industries in which FLSA violations 
are likely to occur. During its annual planning process, the agency 
develops national and local initiatives that focus on selected industries in 
which it will conduct investigations. Individual employers within these 
industries are often selected for these WHD-initiated investigations in one 
of two ways. WHD either obtains a statistical sample of employers or 
selects them using the judgment of its staff—for example, by looking 
through a telephone directory of local businesses. 
Over this period, WHD considered low wage workers to be most 
vulnerable to FLSA violations, but it did not clearly define who these 
workers were or identify the industries in which they were concentrated 
until 2004. Instead, according to WHD officials, the agency relied primarily 
on its historical enforcement data—the majority of which consisted of 
                                                                                                                                    
27GAO. Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and 
Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996). 
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actions initiated by complaints—and observations from regional and 
district officials to focus its compliance activities. WHD centered its work 
on nine industries, and based many of its performance indicators on 
garment manufacturing, nursing homes, and agriculture. However, district 
officials told us that it was difficult to contribute to all of these national 
goals because few of WHD’s offices are located in areas that have a 
substantial number of employers in the garment manufacturing industry to 
investigate. 
To ensure that all of its offices could contribute to its national goals, and 
that industries in which workers are less likely to complain were included 
in its plans, WHD changed its focus to include more low wage industries. 
In 2002, the agency commissioned a series of studies to define the 
population of low wage workers, and to determine in which industries 
these workers were most likely to experience minimum wage and 
overtime violations. Researchers used data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics to estimate how common and severe minimum wage and 
overtime violations were throughout all industries. They found that 33 
industries had a high potential for violations of the minimum wage and 
overtime provisions of FLSA, including 9 that ranked highest nationally for 
violation potential.28 However, since the completion of the studies in 2004, 
WHD has not used this information to substantially refocus its efforts or 
target its investigations. The proportion of WHD-initiated investigations 
targeting these top 9 industries has risen by approximately 2 percent since 
2004. Therefore, the investigations initiated by WHD may not have 
addressed the needs of low wage workers most vulnerable to FLSA 
violations. 
Local WHD officials also told us that despite the results of these studies, 
the focus of their investigations has not substantially changed. For 
example, the agriculture industry, which is not on the national list of 33 
priority industries, was the focus of 16 percent of WHD-initiated 
investigations from 2005 to 2007. In addition, WHD headquarters officials 
told us that the agency cannot regularly measure its progress in improving 
compliance in the 33 industries because it does not have the resources 
needed to conduct the investigations it uses to evaluate whether 
                                                                                                                                    
28The top nine industries identified as those with the highest potential for minimum wage 
and overtime violations were construction; eating and drinking places; certain health 
services, such as medical laboratories and home health care; grocery stores; hospitals; 
elementary and secondary schools; certain business services, such as photo finishing; child 
day care services; and hotels and motels. 
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compliance has improved. Finally, most district-level WHD officials told us 
they were not aware of the specifics of these commissioned studies. For 
example, at one WHD district office, the managers told us brief 
presentations on some of the studies were provided at management 
meetings, but copies of the full studies were not provided, and 
investigators we spoke with at this office said they were not aware of the 
studies and therefore could not incorporate the results of these studies 
into planning their work.  
 
WHD Does Not Sufficiently 
Leverage Existing Tools to 
Increase Compliance 
WHD does not sufficiently leverage its existing tools to increase 
compliance. These include the following: 
Use of penalties for willful and repeat violations. WHD does not 
know the extent to which it has leveraged its statutory penalty authority 
because it does not track how often willful or repeat violations are found. 
WHD can assess penalties when employers willfully or repeatedly violate 
FLSA but WHD does not track how often it finds repeated or willful 
violations or when penalties are not assessed for such violations. In 
addition, a study commissioned by WHD showed that, when employers are 
assessed penalties, they are more likely to comply in the future and other 
employers in the same region—regardless of industry—are also more 
likely to comply. Although the agency has occasionally addressed the use 
of penalties in its performance plans—for example, by including a 
measure for increasing the use of penalties and other remedies in its 2007 
plan–WHD managers did not emphasize the importance of these tools by 
including them in the agency’s performance reports, which are used by 
external groups to hold the agency accountable. Furthermore, there was 
no quantifiable goal associated with the measure in the 2007 plan, and 
officials told us that it was intended only as a reminder to staff that 
penalties were one tool they could use to encourage compliance. 
Collection of back wages and penalties. WHD began collecting more 
data on its enforcement actions in 2000 with the introduction of its 
WHISARD database. However, the agency does not use information on 
whether back wages and penalties assessed are collected to determine 
whether it is fulfilling its mission of ensuring that workers receive the 
wages they are owed or verify that employers are being penalized for 
violating FLSA, respectively. WHD headquarters officials in charge of 
strategic planning told us they do not know whether back wages or 
penalties are collected from employers, although this information is 
tracked in its financial accounting systems. They also could not provide 
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information on how long it takes the agency to collect back wages or 
penalties. 
Hotlines and office telephone lines. WHD is not fully utilizing its 
hotlines or its regular office telephone lines to reach potential 
complainants. WHD has set up some hotlines through partnerships, but 
these hotlines are not always effective. For example, one partnership set 
up a hotline targeted toward Latino workers and hosted by the Mexican 
Consulate. One member of the partnership said that she tested the hotline 
repeatedly over 6-month period but the phone was never answered. When 
we made test calls to this hotline asking about wage-related issues, staff 
either did not refer us to WHD or other government agencies or did not 
return our calls. Phone systems also vary among WHD’s offices, and only 
some have the capacity to take messages outside of office hours, when 
workers with complaints may be more likely to call. For example, at one 
district office, we were told that they did not have an answering machine 
on which callers could leave messages after hours because they had no 
one to return these calls during the day. In addition, state officials and 
advocates said that some local WHD offices are not always available by 
phone to help callers with detailed questions. At one district office we 
visited, investigators said that calls went straight to a voice mail system, 
where callers were instructed to leave a message and wait for a return call 
from WHD staff. 
Partnerships. Although partnerships can help WHD leverage resources 
and reach potential complainants, some of WHD’s partners, including state 
labor agency officials, told us that WHD does not always provide adequate 
support to its partnerships. First, some state officials said that WHD does 
not notify them of the status of complaints or of actions taken. For 
example, one state official told us about a case in which an employer 
violated state and federal labor laws, but WHD settled with the employer 
without consulting state officials. The state officials said they were 
unhappy with the settlement, mainly because it resulted in the employer 
paying less in back wages. Second, WHD has not allowed its investigators 
to take part in some joint investigations with state labor agencies or send 
investigators to events intended to help educate the worker community. 
Third, several of WHD’s partners told us that the agency has not provided 
adequate financial support for outreach events, leaving the funding to 
nonprofit organizations. For example, WHD officials in Houston told us 
that, although one of its partnership’s billboards advertising a hotline for 
Latino workers needed to be replaced, the office was unable to provide 
any funding to replace them because WHD headquarters had not approved 
the funds. In California, WHD officials told us they do not support 
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expanding the agency’s Employment, Education, and Outreach (EMPLEO) 
partnership—which received an award from Harvard University’s Kennedy 
School of Government for successful innovation—to other areas of the 
state or hold certain outreach events because these efforts would generate 
more referrals than the agency could handle. 
 
The extent to which WHD’s activities have improved FLSA compliance is 
unknown, because WHD frequently changes both how it measures and 
how it reports on its performance. When agencies provide trend data in 
their performance reports, decision makers can compare current and past 
progress in meeting long-term goals. While WHD’s long-term goals and 
strategies have generally remained the same since 1997, WHD often 
changes how it measures its progress, keeping about 90 percent of its 
measures for 2 years or less. According to WHD officials, the agency 
decided to discontinue some of its measures either because they had been 
met or because WHD realized they were not appropriate. In addition, while 
WHD specified a number of performance measures each year in its 
planning documents, it included less than one-third of them in its annual 
performance reports. Moreover, although WHD established a total of 131 
performance measures throughout the period from 1997 to 2007, it 
reported on 6 of them for more than 1 year. This lack of consistent 
information on WHD’s progress in meeting its goals makes it difficult to 
assess how well WHD’s efforts are improving compliance with FLSA. 
The Extent to Which 
WHD’s Activities Have 
Improved FLSA 
Compliance Is 
Unknown 
Since the first time Labor was required to report on it performance in 
1999, WHD has included similar performance goals and strategies related 
to its FLSA compliance activities in its annual performance reports. For 
1999 to 2006, WHD had the general outcome goal of increasing compliance 
with worker protection laws and, by 2002, also had a more program-
specific goal of ensuring that American workplaces legally, fairly, and 
safely employed and compensated their workers. For 2007, the agency 
reported on the program-specific goal of ensuring workers received the 
wages due. Also, from 1999 to 2007, the agency reported on how it used its 
three types of compliance activities—enforcement, outreach, and 
partnerships—to reach its goals. 
While its goals and strategies did not change, WHD often changed how it 
measured its progress. From 1997 to 2007, WHD included 131 FLSA-related 
performance measures in its plans but kept about 90 percent of these for 2 
years or less. A majority of these measures—67 percent—were reported 
for only 1 year. Furthermore, for most of the period from 1997 to 2007, 
WHD had strategic initiatives for improving compliance in its targeted 
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industries—agriculture, garment, and health care—as well as a strategic 
initiative designed to measure and reduce recidivism by re-investigating 
employers it had previously investigated and found in violation of FLSA. 
However, the agency also frequently changed how it measured progress in 
both of these areas. For example, although WHD had 10 performance 
measures for improving compliance in agriculture from 1997 to 2007, it 
kept only 1 of them for more than a year. These frequent changes to its 
performance measures have affected the ability of agency officials and 
outside observers to understand WHD’s progress and for agency officials 
to make decisions for future strategic planning. In a recently issued study 
WHD commissioned to obtain recommendations for future performance 
measures for reducing recidivism, researchers found that they could not 
assess the agency’s progress to date because of the frequent changes in its 
measures. 
According to WHD officials, the agency discontinued some of its 
performance measures because they had been met or were not 
appropriate. Specifically, WHD officials stated that during their annual 
planning process, they make ongoing refinements to their performance 
measures. Throughout the years, the agency has decided to discontinue 
measures for several reasons, including (1) the agency data it used to 
assess its progress in meeting the measure were not reliable; (2) agency 
staff did not understand how the measures related to their work; (3) staff 
did not believe the agency could influence the measure through its work; 
(4) the issue the measure was attempting to address was no longer 
relevant; and (5) the agency had met the targets for the measure 
repeatedly. For example, although growers typically rotate their crops 
annually, WHD’s performance measures for the agriculture industry 
focused on compliance among growers of specific crops, such as lettuce 
and tomatoes. After 4 years of using various performance measures based 
on crops, WHD realized that because growers often change crops, this 
approach was not measuring compliance for the same group of growers 
over time and discontinued using these measures. 
In addition to frequently changing its performance measures, WHD does 
not report on many of the measures. While WHD specified a number of 
performance measures each year in its planning documents, it included 
less than one-third of them in its annual performance reports. Of the 131 
FLSA-related performance measures, WHD reported on 40 of them (29 
percent) in its annual performance reports. WHD officials attributed this 
lack of reporting to departmental space limitations in annual reports. 
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Moreover, although WHD reported on 40 of its performance measures 
from 1999 to 2007, it reported on only 6 of them for more than 1 year. The 
agency met 30 of its goals (75 percent) for the measures on which it 
reported, and meeting the goals was among the reasons WHD officials 
cited for discontinuing the use of some measures. However, nearly half of 
the measures WHD met were designed to establish baselines for 
understanding the current state of compliance or an agency process; they 
were not meant to measure agency progress. Overall, the lack of 
consistent reporting further complicates the ability of those within and 
outside the agency to assess how well WHD’s efforts have improved 
compliance with FLSA. 
 
While WHD is responsible for protecting some of the basic rights of U.S. 
workers by enforcing FLSA, it does not know how effectively it is doing 
so. As with all government agencies, WHD must determine how to 
strategically manage its limited resources to help ensure the most efficient 
and effective outcomes. Although WHD has been challenged by reductions 
in its investigative staff, it has not used all available information to 
promote compliance, such as the studies in which it has invested that 
could inform how it targets employers for WHD-initiated investigations. In 
addition, it has not fully leveraged available tools, such as hotlines, office 
phone lines, and partnerships, that could extend its reach or tracked 
penalties and collection of back wages to know their impact on 
compliance. Furthermore, by not consistently measuring and reporting its 
progress in meeting the unchanging goal of ensuring FLSA compliance, the 
agency is unable to account for its progress more than a decade after 
GPRA implementation. 
 
To more effectively plan and conduct its compliance activities, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the Administrator of WHD 
to 
Conclusions 
Recommendations for 
Executive Action 
• enter all complaints and actions taken in response to complaints in its 
WHISARD database, and use this information as part of its resource 
allocation process; 
 
• establish a process to help ensure that input from external 
stakeholders, such as employer associations and worker advocacy 
groups, is obtained and incorporated as appropriate into its planning 
process; 
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• incorporate information from its commissioned studies in its strategic 
planning process to improve targeting of employers for investigation; 
and 
 
• identify ways to leverage its existing tools by improving services 
provided through hotlines, office phone lines, and partnerships, and 
improving its tracking of whether penalties are assessed when repeat 
or willful violations are found and whether back wages and penalties 
assessed are collected. 
 
To provide better accountability in meeting its goal of improving employer 
compliance, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the 
Administrator of WHD to establish, consistently maintain, and report on its 
performance measures for FLSA. 
 
We held a meeting with WHD officials on June 20, 2008, in which we 
discussed our findings and recommendations in detail. At that meeting, 
they provided comments on our recommendation regarding obtaining 
input from external stakeholders. We adjusted the recommendation to 
indicate that they consider stakeholder input only as appropriate. They 
also indicated that their priorities do not currently include entering 
information on all complaints received from workers. However, their 
database would allow them to enter this information. In addition, we 
provided a copy of our draft statement to WHD, but the agency declined to 
comment on it prior to the hearing. 
Agency Comments 
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Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 
to respond to any questions you or other members of the Committee may 
have. 
 
For further information, please contact Anne-Marie Lasowski at  
(202) 512-7215. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony 
include Revae Moran, Danielle Giese, Amy Sweet, Miles Ingram,  
Susan Aschoff, Sheila McCoy, John G. Smale, Jr., Jerome Sandau,  
and Olivia Lopez. 
GAO Contacts 
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Attachment I: Scope and Methodology 
To identify the trends in WHD’s FLSA investigations and other compliance 
activities from fiscal year 1997 to 2007, we obtained and analyzed data 
from WHD’s Wage and Hour Investigator Support and Reporting Database 
(WHISARD). The data included information on WHD’s enforcement 
actions, back wages, penalties, partnerships, and outreach activities. All 
data we reported were assessed for reliability and determined to be 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this statement. In addition, we 
gathered quantitative and qualitative information from agency officials on 
factors that may have influenced these trends, including staff resources. 
To assess the effectiveness of WHD’s planning and implementation of 
compliance activities and whether these activities led to improvements in 
FLSA compliance, we analyzed WHD’s annual performance plans and 
reports in light of GAO’s work and guidance on strategic planning and 
performance management for regulatory agencies. In addition, we 
examined performance assessments conducted by outside experts at 
WHD’s request. 
Finally, for all of these research objectives, we interviewed WHD officials 
at the national and regional level and external organizations representing 
employers and employees affected by WHD’s compliance activities and 
visited WHD and state offices in California, Georgia, New Hampshire, 
Texas, and Wisconsin. We selected these states using several criteria that 
would provide a mix of characteristics, including the concentration of 
hourly workers earning at or below the federal minimum wage in each 
state; the number of formal agreements between WHD and state or local 
organizations; and geographic diversity. We also made test calls to WHD’s 
local and national hotlines. In addition, we reviewed all relevant laws and 
regulations. We conducted this performance audit from August 2007 
through July 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 
audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 
believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
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